1938 Teikoku Kaigun Wall Map of China Bombing, Second Sino-Japanese War

A large and unique product of Japan's full-scale invasion of China and the Japanese military's internal politics, this 1938 wall map was produced by the propaganda arm of the Imperial Japanese Navy. This enormous map is a propaganda vehicle related to the power struggle between the Japanese Army and Navy and their tussle for influence with the government, the Supreme War Council (軍事参議院), and the Emperor. The outcome of this struggle - in favor of the navy, ultimately came to define the Japanese Pacific War strategy. Of note, given this map's rarity and lack of publication information typical of the period (indicating both printing and publication dates), it is evident that this map was produced exclusively for internal naval use.

A Closer Look

Standing over six feet tall, this wall map displays most of 'China Proper,' that is, the more densely populated and sedentary Chinese provinces. Red shading throughout records areas subject to bombing (既ネ到ル所爆擊セシ區域ヲ示ス), while bomb illustrations denote areas of particularly heavy aerial bombardment (重ナル爆擊場所ヲ示ス). A blue line represents Japan's attempted line of naval blockade of the Chinese coast (支那船舶交通遮斷區域) between Shanghaiguan (the end of the Great Wall at the Bohai, also near the border of Japanese-controlled Manchukuo) and Dongxing (here as Dong'ao 東澳) on the Sino-Vietnamese border. In reality, the Imperial Japanese Navy (IJN) was unable to fully police the extremely long Chinese coast, especially in the south, which has a very long history of smuggling and piracy.

Historical Context

By the time of this map's printing, Manchuria had been cleaved off from China and become the Japanese puppet state of Manchukuo, while Japanese troops and their allies had occupied Inner Mongolia (Chahar 察哈爾省 and Suiyuan 綏遠省 Provinces, reorganized as the puppet state of Mengjiang 蒙疆 shortly afterward.). Japan also had, by early 1937, effectively established local puppet administrations for much of northeastern China Proper, including in Beijing (Beiping 北平). Then, in late 1937, with the onset of full-scale war, Shanghai, Nanjing, and surrounding cities surrendered to Japanese troops, and Chiang Kai-Shek's government and armies fell into a chaotic retreat.

A note at the bottom-right indicates that this map reflects the situation as of April 20, 1938. At this point in the war, Japan was riding high, being in control of nearly all of northern China and most of the important cities in the country's east (Shanghai, Nanjing, Hangzhou). Chiang Kai-Shek's forces retreated to Hankou (漢口, Wuhan) and were being steadily pressed from the east, while Japanese forces bombed Chinese cities at will, only somewhat challenged by China's paltry air force and a foreign volunteer corps. But, at the same time, the seeds of Japan's ultimate defeat were already being laid. Failing to force Chiang to surrender, the Japanese Diet admitted that the war in China would be a long haul and enacted a full-scale national mobilization in March 1938, shifting to a total war footing. Moreover, Japanese control over conquered territory was tenuous at best, especially in the countryside, which was a chaotic, contested space between the Imperial Japanese Army (IJA), Chinese regular troops, guerillas of various stripes, bandits, and local self-defense forces.

Foreign colonies and concessions were also problematic - especially Hong Kong, Macao, and the French leased territory of Guangzhouwan (廣州湾), which are singled out in the text accompanying the blue dashed line here. These provided an easy route for smuggling supplies and information to Chinese forces. Japan also had to handle the problem of foreign concessions in most major Chinese ports, including Shanghai, even after Japan had occupied the surrounding Chinese-administered parts of those cities. In the months following this map's production, additional ports (Guangzhou, here as 廣東, Shantou, Xiamen/Amoy, Fuzhou) would be occupied to prevent war materiel from working its way to Chinese troops of guerilla fighters.

Perhaps most directly relevant for this map, the IJA began running into difficulties on the battlefield the further it pressed into the Chinese interior. A series of battles in and around Xuzhou (徐州) failed to encircle and eliminate Chiang's forces, and in the process, Chinese forces gained their first victory of the conflict at the Battle of Tai'erzhuang (台兒莊) in late March - early April 1938.

The IJN and Japan's Imperial Plans

Although both the Imperial Japanese Navy and Imperial Japanese Army were shot through with expansionist nationalism at this time, they also were rivals with competing interests and visions of how Japan's empire should expand. Going back to the Meiji era (1868 - 1912), the army and its political allies argued for a 'northern advance' (北進論), insisting that Japan's future lay in control of Northeast Asia (Korea and Manchuria, followed by China and perhaps even Siberia). The navy's competing 'southern advance' (南進論) instead focused on Southeast Asia and the Pacific. Although the army's vision was more influential in the 1930s, when Japan expanded its influence in China and contemplated war with the Soviet Union, tensions with the U.S. and a fairly calamitous mini-war with the Soviets in 1939 (Nomonhon/ Khalkhin Gol) caused the navy's argument to win out, leading ultimately to the Pearl Harbor attacks and the simultaneous invasions of Western colonies in Southeast Asia.

Even prior to Pearl Harbor, the navy had been so well funded that it was called upon to assist in Japan's full-scale invasion of China, a decidedly land-based conflict. In fact, the IJN Air Service (海軍航空隊) was generally considered to be superior to the army's own air force (Imperial Japanese Army Air Service 陸軍航空部隊). As a result, the navy planes flew thousands of sorties over China, including 'strategic bombing' of cities, a tactic that would become standard practice during World War II and eventually used against Japanese cities as well. As the depth of Japan's challenge in subduing China became clear, the IJN Air Service pounded Chinese cities and was moreover tasked with cutting off supplies to China's wartime capital of Chongqing, which arrived via coastal smuggling or overland routes such as the Kunming-Haiphong Railway (at bottom-left here).

Therefore, this map is very likely related to the political and propaganda struggle between the Japanese army and navy and their tussle for influence with the government, the Supreme War Council (軍事参議院), and the Emperor himself. The displayed naval contributions to the war in China are a clear reminder that the navy was a better fighting force (and therefore a better investment) than their landlubber compatriots. This message would have been especially important for the navy to make at a time when the army was smarting from their shocking and embarrassing defeat at Tai'erzhuang.

Publication History and Census

This map was prepared by the publishing arm of the IJA (帝国海軍社) and the Promotion (i.e. Propaganda) Department of the Ministry of the Navy (海軍省海軍軍事普及部). As stated above, it reflects the situation on April 20, 1938 (Showa 13) and presumably was printed shortly after that time. The lack of the typical publication information that appears on Japanese maps (dates of printing and publication) and the map's rarity suggests that it was produced for internal or restricted use. It is not known to exist in institutional collections or on the market, and we are only aware of one example of an earlier map (with the same title and maker) on which the current map is based, which lacks the red and blue overprint, a date, or any reference to the war. Compared to that map (which was likely prepared in the early-mid 1930s), there are more changes here aside from the overprint, including numerous additional settlements, waterways, rail lines, and other features.